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ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY AND RUSSIAN OIL:
THE YUKOS CASE BEFORE THE HOUSTON COURT
MATTEO M. WINKLER*
"This is a very large case.... [I]t is the largest bankruptcy
case ever filed in the United States."1
"Yukos Oil Company Chief Executive Officer, Steven
Theede, said . . . 'We believe the merits of our case are
strong and simple. Our assets were illegally seized. We
want them back and/or damages paid."'
2
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Yukos Oil Company was established in Russia in 1993 as a
result of the privatization of one of the foremost state-owned oil
and gas companies. Yukos experienced fast growth during the
1990s due to the entrepreneurial inventiveness of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky. 3 In order to attract foreign partners after the ruble
crisis of 1998, Khodorkovsky changed Yukos into a multinational
* J.D., 2001, Catholic University of Milan, Italy; Cultore of International Law,
International Organization and European Union Law, Catholic University of
Milan, Italy; Cultore of International Law, International Studies Department,
University of Studies of Milan, Italy; Ph.D. Candidate in International Law and
Economics, 2006, Luigi Bocconi Commercial University of Milan, Italy; Visiting
Scholar, 2005, Yale Law School. All my thanks go to Professor W. Michael
Reisman for his support and for supervising this Article, and to Gilles Cuniberti,
my precious friend and Maitre de Conference in Paris XII, for listening to me talk
about the Yukos case at least every day for two months. The usual disclaimers
apply.
1 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
2 Press Release, Yukos Oil Co., Yukos Oil Company Comments on Ruling of
U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Feb. 24, 2005).
3 On the problem of privatizations in post-Soviet Russia, see Stefan Hedlund,
Property Without Rights: Dimensions of Russian Privatisation, 53 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
213-37 (2001); Hans-Henning Schroder, El'tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of
Financial Groups in Russian Politics Between 1993 and July 1998, 51 EUR.-ASIA STUD.
957, 962 (1999); Hilary Appel, Voucher Privatisation in Russia: Structural
Consequences and Mass Response in the Second Period of Reform, 49 EUR.-AsIA STUD.
1433, 1443 (1997).
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enterprise by publishing the financial information and the accounts
of Yukos according to the international standards, as well as by
revealing the identities of its shareholders. 4  By employing
managers and directors from several Western oil companies he
formed the management of Yukos and assured himself of control
over the group through indirect participations and trusts.5 The
following data help illustrate the size of Yukos: approximately 600
subsidiaries, of which 200 are active; an average daily output of
more than 1.6 million barrels of oil in 2003; $2 billion in dividends
distributed that same year; and $18 billion in assets.6
Khodorkovsky's political ambitions and huge fortune fueled
the Kremlin's hostility. As a result, Platon Lebedev,
Khodorkovsky's partner and president of Menatep Group, Yukos's
major shareholder, was arrested by Russian police in the beginning
of July 2003. He was suspected of having illegally acquired a stake
in a state-owned fertilizer company, Apatit, in 1994.7 In the early
morning of October 25, 2003, before he could take off in his private
jet from a Siberian airport, Khodorkovsky was arrested and
immediately transferred to Moscow, where he was charged with
fraud and tax evasion. Investigations continued during the
subsequent months, even abroad.8 In the spring of 2004, the
4 For a case study on this topic, see Richard P. Cunningham, Jr., Corporate
Governance and Foreign Investment Nightmares in Russia: A Case Study of Unified
Energy Systems, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 889, 891 (2002).
5 On this topic, see Torrey Clark, Russia's Corporate Values, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 90, 91.
6 See Yukos, About Us, http://www.yukos.com/About-us (last visited Feb.
18, 2006) (follow the "Exploration & Production" and "Corporate Citizenship"
hyperlinks for statistics on Yukos's operations).
7 On the arrest of Khodorkovsky and its effects on the market value of
Yukos's shares, see Legal Briefs: Investigation of Oil Tycoon Seen as Test for Russia,
BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., July 25, 2003, at 13. The charges against Mr. Lebedev
concern the auction of the fertilizer producer, Apatit. In 1994, the Russian
government held a public auction in order to privatize twenty percent of Apatit's
stock. It is the opinion of prosecutors that the four companies that took part in the
auction were mere shell companies, created by Lebedev and Khodorkovsky in
order to simulate the competition required by the law.
8 In March 2004, the Swiss authorities, acceding to a request by Russian
prosecutors, froze about $4.8 billion in five different bank accounts that belonged
to twenty Yukos managers, such as Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. See Andrew
Jack & Haig Simonian, Prosecutors Claim $5bn of Yukos Assets Frozen, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 12, 2004, at 27 (detailing the amounts frozen and the alleged
crimes of Yukos executives); Susan B. Glasser, Russia Says Imprisoned Tycoon's
Swiss Assets Are Frozen, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2004, at A18 (discussing the




Russian Ministry of Finance made several assessments for amounts
due to the tax authorities from previous years;9 at the same time,
from April to June of 2004, almost all of Yukos's assets (e.g., shares
of subsidiaries, bank accounts, real estate) were frozen by the
Russian authorities.
On November 19, 2004, the bailiffs of the Ministry of Justice
announced that an auction would take place on December 19. The
aim was to recover Yukos's assets by auctioning off 76.79% of
Yuganskneftegaz ("YNG") stock. YNG, entirely owned by Yukos,
manages 60% of the production of the group. According to the
notice of sale, the final bidder could have acquired this colossus of
oil production by paying only half of its actual market price.' 0
With the purpose of halting the YNG auction, on December 14,
2004, the managers of Yukos filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition
before a bankruptcy court in Houston, Texas." In this petition they
asked the court to issue a temporary restraining order to stop the
auction and protect Yukos's bankruptcy estate. On December 16,
2004, Judge Clark of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Texas granted the plaintiff's motion, given that "participants in
international commerce ... need to have an expectation that when
they invest in foreign enterprises they may do so without fear that
their investments may be the subject of confiscatory action by
agencies of the foreign government."12 With this order Judge Clark
President Putin).
9 In sum, Russian authorities demand the payment of $27.5 billion of evaded
taxes by Yukos. Including this amount, on December 14, 2004 Yukos declared
debts for $30 billion, with total assets of only $12 billion dollars. See Plaintiff's
Original Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 8, 11, Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian
Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (No. 04-
47742, Adv. No. 04-3952) (filed Dec. 14, 2004).
10 The initial offer for YNG's shares was $8.65 billion. Id. at 12.
11 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). The simple
filing of a petition before a bankruptcy court creates a procedural situation called
an "automatic stay," and accordingly all the actions filed by the creditors are
automatically suspended. As intended by Congress, the automatic stay aims to
protect both the debtor, who in this way can escape the creditors' financial
pressure, and the creditors, who are protected by the par condicio. H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97. The automatic
stay is not permanent and can be revoked by the judge according to specific
provisions of law. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 175, 177 (1977) (explaining the importance of
the use of a stay in bankruptcy proceedings). The automatic stay has applied to
Yukos since the filing of the voluntary petition in the Houston court on December
14, 2004.
12 Erin E. Arvedlund & Simon Romero, Kremlin Reasserts Hold on Russia's Oil
2006]
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forbade the various involved entities from taking part in the
auction: the monopolist company Gazpromneft; Deutsche Bank,
BNP Paribas, and JP Morgan (banks intended to finance the entire
operation); as well as "those persons in active concert or
participation with them."13
The Houston court found jurisdiction over Yukos based on
three issues: the nationality of its Chief Financial Officer; the fact
that Yukos had bank accounts in Texas; and finally, the fact that a
substantial fraction of Yukos stock (more than 15%) was the
property of American institutional investors.14 Thus the court
concluded that "the Debtor maintains significant assets in the
Southern District of Texas, and that Debtor has standing to be a
debtor under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code .... The Court
concludes that the instant case was properly commenced." 15
In fact, in the United States, a foreign entity can be qualified as
a debtor according to the Bankruptcy Code provisions and be
subject to bankruptcy proceedings before U.S. courts if it has assets
within the territory of the United States.16 Federal courts have
exclusive authority on sentencing in regard to bankruptcy
proceedings, 17 and have no discretion when applying 11 U.S.C. §
109(a): "there is 'virtually no formal barrier '" 18 for these courts to
establish their jurisdiction over foreign debtors, and they have no
and Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at Al.
13 Yukos Oil Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130, 138
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004).
14 Id. at 132. The amount of $2 million had been deposited into a bank
account at the Southwest Bank of Texas; one must add to this sum $6 milion
managed by Yukos lawyers. These financial data have been ascertained through
the affidavit of Yukos's Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Misamore. On December 22,
2004, Yukos had deposits of almost $22 million in this bank account.
15 Id.
16 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). In GMAM Investment Funds Trust , Foundation for
Research & WRH Global Securities v. Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes S.A. (In re
Globo Comunicacoes e Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 249 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004),
and in In re Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia Avianca, 303 B.R. 1, 9 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2003), the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that
"there is virtually no formal barrier" to the exercise of jurisdiction by bankruptcy
courts over foreign debtors. Furthermore, to file a bankruptcy petition, "[t]he
Debtors must have property in the United States at the time they actually file their
bankruptcy petition." In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 37 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2000).
17 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2000).
18 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 407 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (quoting




discretion to determine whether a debtor does or does not have
properties in the United States. 19 Once it has been demonstrated
that the debtor has properties within the territory of the United
States, the case cannot be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because
"bank accounts constitute property in the United States for
purposes of eligibility under section 109 of the Bankruptcy
Code."20 The quantity of money contained in the bank accounts is
irrelevant, since even one dollar can be sufficient.
21
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code provides for the
bankruptcy to be extended to all the debtor's assets and properties,
"wherever located." 22 This means that one must consider the
19 Concerning the discretional application of section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the point is that:
[Tihe statute does not appear to be vague or ambiguous, and it seems to
have such a plain meaning as to leave the Court no discretion to consider
whether it was the intent of Congress to permit someone to obtain a
bankruptcy discharge solely on the basis of having a dollar, a dime or a
peppercorn located in the United States.
In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996).
20 In re Global Ocean Carriers, 251 B.R. at 39.
21 See id. (holding that "bank accounts constitute property in the United
States for purposes of eligibility under section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code,
regardless of how much money was actually in them on the petition date"); see
also In re Maxwell Commc'n Corp., 186 B.R. 807, 818-19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(finding that a provision of the Bankruptcy Code did not apply extraterritorially),
affd, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996); Bank of Am., N.T. v. World of English, N.V., 23
B.R. 1015, 1022 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982) (discussing In re San Antonio Land &
Irrigation Co., 228 F. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), which held that a debtor's balance of
$8.06 in a New York bank account was "property"); In re Iglesias, 226 B.R. 721,
722-23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998) (involving a debtor who owned only $522 in a bank
account in the United States).
In many other provisions of the statute the word "property" will be
found; and it is apparent that Congress intended that the United States
courts should deal with and administer the estates of bankrupts if
property existed and was found within our borders. Starting with this
premise, it logically follows that Congress did not mean to exclude from
the operation of the act those persons who are aliens, whether living here
or abroad, who have property within the United States.
In re Berthoud, 231 F. 529, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), quoted in In re Axona Int'l Credit &
Commerce Ltd., 88 B.R. 597, 614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
22 According to the Bankruptcy Code, "[tihe commencement of a case ...
creates an estate" that "is comprised of all the following property, wherever
located and by whomever held." 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). "A voluntary case under
a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under such
chapter." 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Since all the debtor's assets pass to the
bankruptcy estate automatically, it is enough that a petition is filed by a debtor.
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procedure as covering all of Yukos's assets, even those situated in
Russia, including the YNG shares, which were auctioned as
previously mentioned. Finally, one can argue that the basis of a
court's jurisdiction in this type of situation lies in the need to
protect the bankruptcy estate from imminent damage, i.e., the
dismemberment of Yukos's major subsidiary.
Notwithstanding the court's decision, the Russian government
held the auction as scheduled. Gazpromneft was expected to be
the winner; however, two days before the auction, a previously
unknown corporation named Baikalfinansgroup applied to
participate in the auction. On December 19, 2004,
Baikalfinansgroup was the highest bidder and purchased YNG for
the amount of $9.3 billion. According to the press,
Baikalfinansgroup acted on behalf of Gazpromneft, who was
subject to the Houston court's restraining order.23 Following this,
Yukos presented a report to the court alleging a violation of the
restraining order by Gazpromneft.24
On December 28, 2004, the defendant, Deutsche Bank, filed a
motion to dismiss the case. In this motion, Deutsche Bank first
argued that Yukos was not eligible as a debtor according to the
Bankruptcy Code; second, that Yukos filed a voluntary petition in
bad faith with the sole purpose of relitigating before a U.S. court
the disputes pending before the Russian courts; and finally, that
the continuation of the process would have been obstructed by the
application of the doctrines of forum non conveniens, comity, and
act of state.25  Obviously, Yukos challenged these claims,
The federal court before which the petition is filed "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction .. .of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate." 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)
(2000) (emphasis added).
23 Baikalfinansgroup was found to be domiciled in an office of Gazprom.
Moreover, a few days after the auction, Baikal was merged with Rosneft, a state-
owned company, which at the time of the auction was supposed to be merged
with the oil and gas monopoly Gazpronmeft. It is the opinion of some financial
analysts that Baikal has been used by Gazpromneft, subject to the Houston court's
order, and the Russian government in order to renationalize Yukos's productive
units. Yukos's CEO publicly declared that he intends to sue all of the entities
involved in the YNG auction for $20 billion. Benoit Faucon, Yukos CEO: Finalizing
New Strategy After Yugansk Sale, Dow JoNEs NEWSWIRE, Feb. 1, 2005, http://jpmc
.lonebuffalo.com/story.cfm?storyid=948777 (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
24 Elif Kaban, Yukos May Seek US Court Ruling Against Gazprom, Bus. REP.,
Dec. 22, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fArticleld=
2353716.




presenting a detailed plan of reorganization. 26 On February 24,
2005, after a two-day hearing, Judge Clark of the Houston
bankruptcy court granted Deutsche Bank's motion and dismissed
the case, terminating the dispute based on § 1112(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.
27
2. ARBITRATION AND RUSSIAN LAW
Along with the bankruptcy petition, Yukos simultaneously
filed a motion to force arbitration with the Russian Federation.
28
According to the plaintiff's motion, the Russian Federation's attack
against Yukos "violate[d] Russia's foreign investment laws, which
provide for international arbitration of investment disputes, as well
as Russia's obligations under its treaties and international law."
29
Which laws and international treaties cited by Yukos were
supposed to be the basis for referring the dispute to arbitration?
How could the dispute be settled through arbitration without an
arbitration agreement between Yukos and the Russian Federation?
19, In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (No. 04-47742) (filed
Dec. 28, 2004).
26 See Press Release, Yukos Oil Co., Yukos Oil Company Comments on
Ruling of U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Feb. 24, 2005) (explaining the merits of their
position in reaction to the dismissal).
27 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 410-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). In its
judgment, the court applied § 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which justifies the
dismissal of the case "for cause," i.e., for a specific reason provided by the law. 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2000). However, the court did not refer to any of the causes
listed by § 1112(b), but instead referred to the intention of Congress. According to
Congress, the list of causes is not exhaustive. In re Yukos Oil, 321 B.R. at 410
(citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6362). Thus, the totality of circumstances convinced Judge Clark to grant
Deutsche Bank's motion to dismiss. Id. at 411.
28 Yukos filed two motions before the United States bankruptcy court in
Houston. The first, Yukos Oil Company Motion to Compel Arbitration, Yukos Oil
Co. v. Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2004) (No. 04-47742, Adv. No. 04-3952) (filed Dec. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Motion to
Compel Arbitration], was filed simultaneously with the voluntary petition,
Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition Filed by Yukos Oil Company, Yukos Oil Co. v.
Russian Federation (In re Yukos Oil Co.), 320 B.R. 130 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (No.
04-47742, Adv. No. 04-3952) (filed Dec. 14, 2004). The other, Yukos Oil Company's
Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration, In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2005) (No. 04-47742) (filed Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Amended Motion
to Compel Arbitration], was filed in view of a hearing, scheduled on February 24,
2005, which never took place. According to statute, all the claims related to a
bankruptcy can be brought to the attention of the bankruptcy court, if allowed by
the law and not inconsistent with the bankruptcy code. 9 U.S.C. § 6 (2000).
29 Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 28, at 2.
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First of all, with regard to Russian domestic law, one must note
that the major problem encountered by foreign investors in the oil
and gas sectors comes from the transition (still in progress) of the
old Soviet regime to the new market economy. In fact, the Russian
market presents several evident risks related to: on the one hand,
economic matters, such as the instability of the system and the
persistent power of state-controlled monopolies; and, on the other
hand, political and juridical matters, such as the deficiency of
detailed regulations, the lack of antitrust rules, and the uncertainty
of laws.30 The first laws enacted by the Russian Parliament ("the
Duma") at the beginning of the 1990s inadequately protected
foreign investors, even though those laws were formally intended
to attract foreign capital, because there was strong support for
maintaining the old sector monopolies. 31 Although celebrated as a
30 See Arina Shulga, Comment, Foreign Investment in Russia's Oil and Gas:
Legal Framework and Lessons for the Future, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1067, 1069
(2001) ("[T]he structural risks to foreign investors include, but are not limited to,
the present control of Russia's oil and gas sectors ...by former oil and gas
ministers, the existence of an oil pipeline monopoly ... and the lack of antitrust
measures").
31 See David F. Black, So You Want to Invest in Russia? A Legislative Analysis of
the Foreign Investment Climate in Russia, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 123, 123-57 (1996)
(describing the risks foreigners take when investing in Russia given the statutes in
place); see also Shulga, supra note 30, at 1079-103 (describing the privatization of
Russia's oil sector, and the regulatory framework for foreign investment that
followed). Some laws enacted aimed to provide a minimum standard of support
against political risks but failed to offer adequate protection for foreign
investment. E.g., Federal'niy Zakon o RSFSR ob Inostrannix Investitsiyax v
RSFSR [Law on Foreign Investments in the RSFSR], Vedemosti S"ezda
Narodnykh Deputatov RSFSR i Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR [Ved. RSFSR]
[Bulletin of the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Soviet Federal
Socialist Republic and Supreme Council of the RSFSR] 1991, No. 29, Item 1008,
translated in COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF RUSSIA bk. XII.A.1-7, at 15 (trans. W.E.
Butler, 1993) [hereinafter 1991 Law on Foreign Investment]. The 1991 Law on
Foreign Investment required some foreign investment projects to register with
and get authorization from the Ministry of Finance. Id. art. 16. Article 7 of that
law only provided a generic guarantee against nationalizations and
expropriations, exempting protection in exceptional "cases when such measures
are adopted in social interests." Id. art. 7. Article 10 only allowed foreign
corporations to repatriate dividends after paying high taxes. Id. art. 10. For a
global view of these issues, see Robert Starr, Foreign Participation in Oil and Gas
Projects in the Former Soviet Union: A Legal Perspective, 12 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCES L. 442, 442-51 (1994). There are similar gaps in other laws, including
one forcing foreign investors to obtain government licenses taxed at a high rate.
See Law of the Russian Federation on the Subsoil, Ved. RSFSR 1992, No. 16, Item
834, translated in COLLECTED LEGISLATION OF RUSSIA bk. VII.2-4, at 1 (trans. W.E.
Butler, 1993) [hereinafter 1992 Law on Subsoil]. On the genesis of the licenses
enabled by the 1992 Law of Subsoil, see Giuditta Cordero Moss, Contract or
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/3
ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY
real change in the regulation of the Russian oil market, the 1995
PSA Law, which regulated production sharing agreements, did not
concretely change the situation because its norms continued to
guarantee the Russian Federation a more advantageous position
than those given to private contractors.32
The 1999 Law on Foreign Investment was an attempted
revolution, expressly granting foreign investors a range of
protective instruments.33 Its scope encapsulates "state guarantees.
. .to foreign investors in connection with their investments in the
Russian Federation." 34 Foreign investors (as defined in article 2)
are entitled to enjoy a range of "legal protection[s], guarantees and
privileges," namely:
(a) the principle of national treatment;35
License? Regulation of Petroleum Investment in Russia and Foreign Legal Advice, 16 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 186, 186-99 (1998).
32 Enacted by President Yeltsin on December 30, 1995, this law, Federal'niy
Zakon o Soglasheniyax o Razdele Produktsii [Federal Law on Production Sharing
Agreements], Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation Collection of Legislation] 1995, No. 225-FZ, translated in 35 I.L.M. 1256
(1996) [hereinafter 1995 PSA Law], contains new provisions on international joint
ventures. Article 8 allows foreign companies to deduct the costs from a
percentage of a project's earnings. Id. art. 8. Article 13 exempts foreign investors
from any quantitative restriction to export of oil, only forcing them to pay taxes on
profits and on the subsoil exploitation. Id. art. 13. However, like the 1991 Law on
Foreign Investment and the 1992 Law on Subsoil, the 1995 PSA Law is pervaded
by a protectionist spirit. Investors are still requested to obtain licenses from the
government and cannot assign their licenses to third parties without the
government's consent. Id. art. 16.1. Although article 17.1 requires consent of both
parties to modify an agreement, its unconventional wording may hamper this
guarantee. See Ernest Chung, Petroleum Investment in the Russian Federation,
Russian Federal Law No. 225-FZ on Production Sharing Agreements (Dec. 30, 1995), 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 551, 562-64 (1996) ("Potential investors have voiced concern that
under this provision, the Russian government may unilaterally modify contracts
in the event of an unanticipated rise in world oil prices .. "); Mark A. Stoleson,
Investment at an Impasse: Russia's Production-Sharing Agreement Law and the
Continuing Barriers to Petroleum Investment in Russia, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 671,
682-86 (1997) (critiquing the statutory protections offered to foreign investors in
the wake of the 1995 PSA Law).
33 See Federal'niy Zakon ob Inostrannix Investitsiyax v Rossiyiskoi Federatsii
[Federal Law on Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation], SZ RF 1999, No.
160-FZ, translated in 7 INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of
Inv. Disputes, Release No. 2000-2, Nov. 2000) [hereinafter 1999 Law on Foreign
Investment]. For a brief comment on the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, see
Shulga, supra note 30, at 1088.
34 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, art. 1.1.
35 The principle of national treatment is contained in article 4.1 of the 1999
2006]
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(b) the freedom to acquire securities and to assign the
rights and duties associated with contracts to third
parties; 36
(c) the freedom to transfer dividends abroad;
37
(d) the right to "receive compensation for damages inflicted
on it as a result of illegal actions (failure to act) of any
governmental... authorities";
38
(e) protection against specific measures intended to limit
an investors' patrimonial rights, such as "forced seizure,
including nationalization [and] requisition" and the
related right to claim compensation of "the value of the
seized property"; 39 and
Law on Foreign Investment. "The legal regime governing the investment activites
of a foreign investor... may not be less favorable than regime governing the
investment activities... established for Russian investors...." Id. art. 4.1.
Because the national treatment clause is inserted in multinational or bilateral
treaties, it is useful to remember that it applies exclusively to citizens of parties to
those treaties. See LUIGI MIGLIORINO, GLI ACCORDI INTERNAZIONALI SUGLI
INVESTIMENTI [THE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON INVESTMENTS] 81-89 (1989).
The benefits provided by the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, however, have an
erga omnes scope, extending to all foreign investment-even if the investor is not a
citizen of parties to those treaties.
36 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, arts. 7, 13.
37 Id. art. 11.
38 Id. art. 5.2.
39 Id. art. 8:
1. The property of a foreign investor or an organization with foreign
investments shall not be subject to forced seizure, including
nationalization and requisition, except in the instances and on the
grounds established by the federal laws or treaties of the Russian
Federation.
2. In the event of a requisition, a foreign investor or a commercial
organization with foreign investments shall be compensated for the
value of the seized property. After the circumstances in connection with
which a requisition occurred cease to exist, a foreign investor or a
commercial organization with foreign investments shall have the right
to demand the return of the remaining property through the court
system, but in so doing that, the investor must then return the received
compensation amount, taking into account the property's depreciation.
When the property of a foreign investor or a commercial
organization with foreign investments is nationalized, such investor or
the organization shall be compensated for the value of the property and
other damages. Disputes regarding such damages shall be settled in
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/3
ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY
(f) the right to resolve "disputes between the state and the
investor . . by litigation, arbitration, or court of
arbitration."40
At the same time, foreign investors have to respect some rules,
such as Russian antitrust regulations, liquidation procedures, and
disclosure rules.
41
Yukos is entitled to enjoy the benefits provided by the 1999
Law on Foreign Investment because it has enough foreign
patrimonial interests to be included under its protection program.
While Yukos is a Russian corporation, its shareholders are almost
entirely foreign corporations. Although the majority is held
indirectly by a group of Russian oil tycoons (including Lebedev
and Khodorkovsky), 60.5% of Yukos stock is owned by Menatep
Group (a company incorporated in Gibraltar), which controls an
additional 10% through the Veteran Petroleum Trust.42 It is also
important to note that a significant share, some 15%, is owned by
American and European institutional investors. 43 Yukos can take
advantage of some protections afforded by the 1999 Law on
Foreign Investment that generally apply to corporations having at
least 10% of their stock held by foreign investors.44 In order to
accordance with Article 10 hereof.
40 1995 PSA Law, supra note 32, art. 22. The 1995 PSA Law states that the
arbitration can be initiated exclusively according to the express agreement of the
parties to the production sharing agreement ("PSA"). Id. According to article 23,
agreements between the Russian Federation and foreign nationals or legal entities
could be grounds for a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity. Id. art.
23. According to article 24, international treaties that the Russian Federation has
entered into supersede any conflicting domestic law. Id. art 24. For a brief
commentary on the dispute resolution provisions, see Chung, supra note 32, at
565-66.
41 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, arts. 18, 20, 21.
42 As of December 14, 2004, 60% of Yukos's stock was held by the Menatep
Group Ltd., a Gibraltar corporation, through its subsidiary Yukos Universal Ltd.,
an Isle of Man corporation, which owns the actual shareholder, Hulley
Enterprises Ltd., a Cyprus corporation. Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note
28, at 8. Also, 10% of Yukos's stock is held by Veteran Petroleum Trust, which is a
group of retired Yukos managers, and 18% is held by the Deutsche Bank Trust
Company Americas. Yukos Oil Co., Shareholding Structure, http://www.yukos
.com/newir/Shareholding-structure.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
43 Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 28, at 8.
44 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33. Article 4.5 requires that
foreigners who hold at least a 10% stake in Russian investments be afforded full
legal protections. Id. art. 4.5. Article 4.6 states that foreigners are afforded these
protections because they are shareholders in Russian commercial organizations
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
discover with certitude the exact degree of protection provided to
Yukos by Russian and international law, it is appropriate to begin
with an analysis of the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment's
arbitration provision.
3. YUKOS AND THE PYRAMIDS CASE
As anticipated, article 10 of the 1999 Law on Foreign
Investment generally provides that "[a] foreign investor's
implementation of investment and entrepreneurial activities on the
territory of the Russian Federation shall be resolved in compliance
with the international treaties of the Russian Federation and
federal laws in the court or arbitration court or in an international
arbitration court (umpire)."4
5
As stated in the title of article 10, the Russian legislature
intended to give investors a "guarantee" of recourse to arbitration
according to the internal laws and international treaties practiced
in Russia. 46 It is useful to clarify the real significance of this
provision and ask both whether it gives investors a seamless
guarantee and whether the content of this guarantee is determined
according to the cited norms. It therefore seems appropriate to
make some remarks regarding the general problem of foreign
investors using arbitration when dealing with the internal laws
and international treaties that are supposed to protect investments
abroad.
To start, the primary origin of arbitration lies in an agreement
between the parties. In other words, arbitration can be defined as a
"product" of contract.47 According to this traditional concept,
afforded the same protections. Id. art. 4.6. Lawyers for Yukos have argued that
the protections afforded by the 1999 Law on Foreign Investments should be
applied to all legal guarantees, not simply those associated with the principle of
national treatment. See Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 28, at 17
(arguing that the protections afforded by the 1999 Law on Foreign Investments
should be applied to Yukos and the court should therefore force arbitration of
issues pursuant to the Law).
45 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, art. 10.
46 Article 10 of the 1999 Law on Foreign Investment is entitled "The guarantee
of the resolution in due course of a dispute arising from a foreign investor's
investment and entrepreneurial activities on the territory of the Russian
Federation." Id. art. 10 (emphasis added).
47 Note, however, that this point has been widely disregarded by academics.
See e.g., PIERO BERNARDINI, L'ARBITRATO COMMERCIALE INTERNAZIONALE 91 (2000)
(Italy); RENE DAVID, L'ARBITRAGE DANS LE COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 86 (1982) (Fr.);
JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: IN A NUTSHELL 143
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when an agreement is lacking, arbitration cannot be initiated. The
ICSID Convention of 1965,48 which dealt with the settlement of
investment disputes between a state and the citizens of another
state, represents the principle instrument in the realm of
investment protection. The convention was intended to suit the
contractual vision of international arbitration. Article 25, regarding
the submission of the disputes to the jurisdiction of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID"), required that "the parties to the dispute consent in
writing to submit to the Center" and, consequently, that "[w]hen
the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its
consent unilaterally."
49
What about the rules concerning disputes which are not
protected by an agreement? In this case the traditional doctrine
confirms that the investor has no other choice than to file claims
before a national court.
One frequently used solution is to understand whether or not,
(1992); and JEAN-CHRISTOPHE POMMIER, PRINCIPE D'AUTONOMIE ET LOI DU CONTRAT
EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE CONVENTIONNEL (1992) (Fr.). At the same time,
several decisions in American jurisprudence do consider that arbitration is "a
creature of contract." See, e.g., White v. Kampner, 641 A.2d 1381, 1384 (Conn.
1994); Waterbury v. Waterbury Police Union Local 1237, 407 A.2d 1013, 1014
(Conn. 1979); Bd. of Mgmt. of Courtyards at Woodlands Condominium Ass'n v.
IKO Chicago, Inc., 697 N.E.2d. 727, 731 (Ill. 1998) (stating that arbitration is a
creature of contract). There are also a large number of cases that define arbitration
as a "matter of contract." See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
547 (1963) ("[Wihether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, is a matter to
be determined by the court on the basis of the contract entered into by the
parties."); Hussey Metal Div. v. Lectromelt Furnace Div., McGraw-Edison Co., 471
F.2d 556, 557 (3d Cir. 1972) ("Arbitration is a matter of contract ...."). For
additional examples of cases, see the jurisprudence referred to in 1 DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-5 (Larry E. Edmondson ed., 3d ed. 2003).
48 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
49 Id. art. 25(1). For more discussion of this concept, see the observations
made by Brigitte Stem, Le consentement ? i'arbitrage CIRDI en mati~re
d'investissement international: que disent les travaux preparatoires? [CIRDI Aribtration
in Matters of International Investment: Mhat Do Preliminary Studies Say?], in
SOUVERAINETE ETATIQUE ET MARCHES INTERNATIONAUX A LA FIN DU 20EME SIECLE: A
PROPOS DE 30 ANS DE RECHERCHE DU CREDIMI 223, 232 (Charles Leben et al. eds.,
2000). See also Carolyn Lamm & Abby Cohen Smutny, The Implementation of ICSID
Arbitration Agreements, 11 ICSID REV.- FOREIGN INV. L.J. 64, 68 (1996) (discussing
the jurisdiction of the International Center for Settlement of Disputes ("ICSID")
and the general framework of the ICSID system established by the ICSID
Convention).
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even without a contract, the state has previously given the investor
the consent to arbitration through either a national law norm or an
international treaty provision. In these cases, one might carefully
assume that the state intended to "offer" the investor the chance to
unilaterally activate arbitration without a specific arbitration
agreement. This solution has been adopted by the decisions of
some arbitration tribunals run according to the ICSID rules. In
those decisions, the lack of jurisdiction, which is the absence of the
state's consent, has been overcome by recognizing the consent of
the state in the national laws or in international treaties to submit
disputes to ICSID jurisdiction when dealing with foreign
investment arbitrators.
With regard to the consent sanctioned by national laws, 5 0 in the
famous Pyramids case, an arbitration tribunal constituted under
ICSID rules heard a dispute between a Hong Kong corporation,
Southern Pacific Properties Ltd. ("SPP"), and the Egyptian
Government.5' This happened because article 8 of an Egyptian
50 Note that no uniformity exists among the different national legislations
concerning the acceptation of the ICSID jurisdiction. For a discussion of this, see
George R. Delaume, How To Draft an ICSID Arbitration Clause, 7 ICSID REV.-
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 168, 172-74 (1992). For a bibliography of scholars' contributions
about different national laws, see Ruvan de Alwis, Margrete Stevens & Nassib G.
Ziad6, Bibliography on Recent National Investment Codes, 7 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 497, 512 (1992). In his commentary on article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
Christoph Schreuer describes the various national legislations and divides them in
five groups: (a) the laws that "provide unequivocally for dispute settlement by
ICSID," such as the Albanian Law on Foreign Investment of 1993; (b) those that,
more commonly, "include a reference to the Convention as one of several possible
means of dispute settlement"; (c) those that "state that the foreign investor 'shall
be entitled to request' that the dispute be conclusively settled by one of several
methods including the ICSID Convention, [or] that any of the parties to the
dispute 'may transfer the dispute' to one of several institutions, including ICSID,
or that the dispute 'shall be settled' by one of these methods," such as article 8 of
the Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974, translated in 16 I.L.M. 1476 (1977); (d) those that
recall the ICSID "Additional Facility" rules, applying when one of the parties of
the dispute "does not meet the nationality requirements of Art. 25 of the
Convention"; and (e) those that require the existence of a specific arbitral
agreement between the parties in order to initiate arbitration. CHRISTOPH H.
SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 200-05 (2001).
51 S. Pac. Prop. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Pyramids), 16 Y.B. COM. ARB.
19 (ICSID Arb. Trib. 1991). The Pyramids case was concluded in December 1992,
fourteen years after the constitution of the arbitration tribunal. The case
concerned a dispute arising in May of 1978, when the Egyptian government
decided to revoke authorization for the construction of a tourist oasis in the
Pyramids area, which had been granted to Southern Pacific Properties Limited
("SPP") a few years before. In 1974, the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism, the Office
of Tourism ("EGOTH"), and SPP concluded an agreement for the realization of
[Vol. 27:1
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Law of 1974 generally provided that all the investment disputes
related to foreign investments would have been settled according
to the ICSID Convention and other international treaties applicable
the aforementioned project, recalling in the preamble the norms contained in the
Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974, supra note 50, at 1476. At the end of the same year,
EGOTH and SPP concluded a second contract, providing that their dispute would
be settled according to the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") Rules.
This agreement was signed by the Ministry of Tourism. The oasis's construction
began in July 1977, but in May 1978, as anticipated above, the Egyptian
government halted the project. In December of that year, SPP and its subsidiary
requested arbitration before the ICC, against both the EGOTH and the Egyptian
Republic. On Feb. 16, 1983, the arbitral tribunal rendered an award,
notwithstanding the defendant's exceptions with regard to the tribunal's
jurisdiction. The ICC award in the SPP decision can be found in 22 I.L.M 752
(1983), 1986 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE [REV. ARB.] 105, 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 111 (1984).
On March 28, 1983, Egypt filed a claim before the Paris cour d'appel, asking for the
suspension of the award. On July 12, 1984, the court granted the plaintiff's claim.
Arab Republic of Egypt v. S. Pac. Prop. Ltd., Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of
appeal] Paris, July 12, 1984, translated in 23 I.L.M. 1048 (1984). The cour de cassation
confirmed the judgment on January 6, 1987. S. Pac. Prop. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, Cour de cassation, premiere chamber civile [Cass. le civ.] [highest court of
ordinary jurisdiction] Jan. 6, 1987, Bull. civ. I, No. 24P, translated in 26 I.L.M. 1004
(1987). At the same time, SPP sought enforcement of the award in the
Netherlands, where the courts granted the exequatur. S. Pac. Prop. Ltd./Arab
Republic of Egypt, Gerechtshof [Hof] [ordinary court of appeal], Amsterdam, 12
juli 1984, translated in 24 I.L.M. 1040 (1985). This was appealed by the defendant
but suspended pending the trial before the French cour de cassation. SPP also
sought enforcement in the United Kingdom, SPP (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, March 19, 1984, High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division
(Commercial Court), affid, March 19, 1984, Court of Appeal (Civil Division),
reprinted in 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 504 (1985), and initiated a new arbitral proceeding
before an ICSID tribunal. After having rendered two other decisions regarding
the jurisdiction on November 27, 1985 and April 14, 1988, the ICSID tribunal
pronounced an award on May 20, 1992. S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, May 20, 1992 (ICSID Arb. Trib.), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 933
(1993); 4 RIVISTA DELL'ARBITRATO 145 (1994) note Giardina (Italy); 121 JOURNAL DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [J.D.I.] 218 (1994) note Gaillard (Fr.). On May 27, 1992,
Egypt asked for the annulment of the award, but the ad hoc committee, who
should have decided this last claim, never pronounced a decision because the
parties entered into an agreement on December 11, 1992 that terminated the
dispute. S.P.P Settled; Annulment Proceedings Before ICSID Discontinued, 8
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 1, 2 (1993).
For more in depth analysis of the Pyramids case, see William Laurence Craig,
The Final Chapter in the Pyramid Case: Discounting an ICSID Award for Annulment
Risk, ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 264; Georges R. Delaume, The Pyramid Stand:
The Pharaohs Can Rest in Peace, 8 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INv. L.J. 231(1993); Philippe
Leboulanger, Ftat, politique et arbitrage: L'affaire du plateau des Pyramides, 1986 REV.
ARB. 3; Patrick Rambaud, L'affaire "des Pyramides," 31 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [A.F.D.I.] 508 (1985).
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to Egypt.52 SPP alleged that article 8 "contains a sequence of
obligatory hierarchies in establishing the rules of the disputes."5 3
This meant that because the parties' agreement lacked an
arbitration clause, the bilateral treaty, and consequently the ICSID
Convention, would be used. The law uses mandatory terms, such
as "dispute shall be settled," and in this way discloses Egypt's
consent to submit disputes to those specific procedures of
settlement.54 On this issue, the arbitration tribunal argued that
"nobody contradicts that the State can give the consent to the
competence of an international arbitration both in a specific
contract, and more generically, in a law related to foreign
investments."55
Case in point, the arbitration tribunal observed that Egypt's
consent did not come from an internal law but from article 25 of
the ICSID Convention, which describes the conditions under which
investment disputes are submitted to international arbitration.56
The case Tradex Hellas v. Albania5 7 involved a dispute between a
Greek corporation and the Albanian government concerning the
expropriation of a joint venture. When the plaintiff initiated
arbitration before an ICSID tribunal, Albania contended that the
52 Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provisions
of the law shall be settled in a manner to be agreed upon with the investor,
or within the framework of the agreements in force between the Arab
Republic of Egypt and the investor's home country, or within the
framework of the Convention for Settlement of Investment Disputes
between the State and the nationals of other countries to which Egypt has
adhered by virtue of Law Number 90 of 1971, where such law applies.
Disputes may be settled through arbitration.
Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974, supra note 50, art. 8 (emphasis added).
53 S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, May 20, 1992,
para. 72 (ICSID Arb. Trib.), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 933, 950 (1993).
54 Id. para. 74, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. at 951 (emphasis added).
55 Id.
56 Gaillard explains:
I1 ne s'agit ni d'une question d'interpr6tation d'un traitS, ni d'une
question d'interpretation d'une loi, mais simplement de la recherche de
l'existence d'une volont6 (unilat6rale s'agissant d'une offre) de recourir A
ce mode de r~glement des diff6rends [it is not a question of interpreting
a treaty or a law. It is simply the research of an existing consent (which
is unilateral because it is an offer) to use this rule for the disputes].
Gaillard, supra note 51, at 227.
57 Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, Dec.
24, 1996, 14 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 161 (1999). The award for this case was




tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the dispute. As a response,
arbitrators observed, citing the Pyramids case, that:
although consent by written agreement is the usual method
of submission to ICSID jurisdiction, it can now be
considered as established and not requiring further
reasoning that such consent can also be effected unilaterally
by a Contracting State in its national laws the consent
becoming effective at the latest if and when the foreign
investor files its claim with ICSID making use of the
respective national law.
5 8
Although the proposed solution was not really consistent with
the intention of the contracting states during the negotiations of the
ICSID Convention, arbitrators considered that internal laws can
constitute an expression of consent according to article 25 of the
Convention.59  Fundamentally, the recognition of ICSID
58 Tradex, 14 ICSID -FOREIGN INV. L. at 186-87. This case refers to article 8.2
of the Albanian Law No. 7764 of Nov. 2, 1993, which states:
If a foreign investment dispute arises between a foreign investor and the
Republic of Albania and it cannot be settles amicably, then the foreign
investor may choose to submit the dispute for resolution to a competent
court or administrative tribunal of Republic of Albania in accordance
with its laws. In addition, if the dispute arises out or relates to
expropriation, compensation for expropriation, or discrimination...
then the foreign investor may submit the dispute for resolution and the
Republic of Albania hereby consents to the submission thereof, to the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ....
Id. at 174.
59 Stem, supra note 49, at 233-44. Paragraph 23 of the Report of the Executive
Directors of the World Bank on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States explains that "[clonsent of the parties is
the cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre. Consent to jurisdiction must be
in writing and once given cannot be withdrawn unilaterally (Article 25.1)."
Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, March 18,
1965, ICSID/15/Rev.1, at 35, 43 (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. Paragraph 24 states:
Consent of the parties must exist when the Centre is seized ... but the
Convention does not otherwise specify the time at which consent should
be given. Consent may be given, for example, in a clause included in an
investment agreement, providing for the submission to the Centre of
future disputes arising out of that agreement, or in a compromis regarding
a dispute which has already arisen. Nor does the Convention require
that the consent of both parties be expressed in a single instrument.
Thus, a host State might in its investment promotion legislation offer to
submit disputes arising out of certain classes of investments to the
2006]
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jurisdiction through national legislation can be interpreted as a
unilateral "offer" to conclude an arbitration agreement directed
from the state to the foreign investor who, in order to set up the
arbitration proceedings, will be surely able to accept.
4. CONSENT TO ARBITRATION IN THE ICSID SYSTEM
In studying ICSID dispute resolution, one has to keep in mind
that previous investment protection treaties had only encouraged
parties to use arbitration when specific arbitration agreements
between investors and host states existed when they examine the
jurisdiction provisions contained in both bilateral60  and
multilateral 61 treaties. In contrast, more recent international
jurisdiction of the Centre, and the investor might give his consent by
accepting the offer in writing.
Id.; see also Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, 136 RECUEIL DES CouRs 331, 353 (1972)
(discussing consent requirements in article 25 of the Convention); Georges R.
Delaume, Pratique du CIRDI, 109 J.D.I. 775, 782 (1982) (discussing resources
investors have under French law that allows them to commit to arbitration
through contract); Migliorino, supra note 35, at 205-09; Giorgio Sacerdoti, Bilateral
Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS
251, 443 (1997) (discussing the consent and timing issues for bilateral investment
treaties); P.F. Sutherland, The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 367, 381 (1979) (discussing article 25's statement of
consent requirement).
60 Concerning the bilateral treaties, one must observe that "[n]ot all
references to the Convention in BITs [bilateral investment treaties] constitute
binding offers of consent by the host State." SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 212.
There are four ways for a host state to express its consent to ICSID jurisdiction in a
bilateral treaty: (a) provisions that subject some disputes to ICSID jurisdiction (for
examples, see the case Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 580 (1991),
and the cases cited infra note 63); (b) provisions, while not expressly mentioning
consent, that state that all disputes "shall be submitted to the Centre" or that
parties have the right to initiate arbitration; (c) provisions that mak ICSID
jurisdiction an eventual alternative for dispute settlement; and (d) provisions that
offer consent in the future or promising consideration of arbitration initiation
requests by foreign investors. See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS,
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 131-36 (1995) (providing real examples of the
ways a host state may express their consent to ICSID jurisdiction); Christoph
Schreuer, The Interpretation of ICSID Arbitration Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ERIC SuY 719, 719 (Karel Wellens
ed., 1998) (addressing the ways consent agreements may be expressed in bilateral
treaties); Paul Peters, Dispute Settlement Arrangements in Investment Treaties, 22
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 120-25 (1991) (discussing the variety of clause types in
those BITs lacking compulsory arbitration).
61 Not many multilateral treaties allow investors to initiate ICSID arbitration.
In addition to the Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, Dec. 12, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 100
[hereinafter ECT], see the North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex.,
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/3
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agreements make the use of arbitration compulsory, requiring that
host states give investors unilateral ability to initiate arbitration.
Several treaties demand that all disputes arising between investors
and host states be resolved by arbitration whenever an investor
demands it.62 According to article 25 of the ICSID Convention,
host states that sign such agreements are essentially consenting to
ICSID jurisdiction.
63
However, that unilateral "offer" to arbitrate does not conclude
an arbitration agreement; an arbitration agreement is concluded
only when an investor has "accepted" that offer. Given this, an
investor's acceptance is essential to initiate arbitration correctly.
Consequently, a host state that has agreed to ICSID arbitration
cannot activate that arbitration without an investor's consent. In
contrast, no host state that has given such consent can withdraw
that consent without violating its treaty obligations. 64
art. 26, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; Protocolo de Colonia
para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones en el Mercosur
(Intrazona) [Colonial Protocol for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments in Mercosur], Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Jan. 17, 1994; Decreto de
Promulgaci6n del Tradatdo de Libre Comercio [Free Trade Agreement], Mex.-
Col.-Venez., art. XIV, June 13, 1994, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 9 de
Enero de 1995 (Mex.). See also Lamm & Smutny, supra note 49, at 70 (describing
the basic form of the ISCID system).
62 On this point, see Genevieve Bastid-Burdeau, Nouvelles Perspectives pour
l'Arbitrage dans le contentieux iconomiques intgressant les Etats, 1995 REV. ARB. 1, 12
(Fr.). In Asian Agricultural Products, the arbitral tribunal held that ICSID
jurisdiction existed even without specific arbitral agreement between the parties
involved. 29 I.L.M. at 586-87. In this instance, the arbitrators observed that the
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Sri Lanka, art.
8.1, Feb. 13, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 888, between the United Kingdom (the investor's state)
and Sri Lanka (the state where the investment sat) contained a provision allowing
ICSID jurisdiction for the settlement of disputes concerning foreign investment.
By applying this provision, the tribunal retained jurisdiction. On this case, see
Patrick Rambaud, Des Obligations de l'tat vis t vis de l'Investisseur Etranger
(sentence AAPL c.Sri Lanka), 38 A.F.D.I. 501-10 (1992).
63 This was the arbitration tribunal's reasoning in the case Tradex, 14 ICSID
REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. at 188. Similar cases include American Manufacturing &
Trading v. Republic of Zaire, 36 I.L.M. 1534 (1997), which involved the Treaty
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Zaire, art. 7.2, Aug. 3, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-17, and Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela,
37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998), which concerned the Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Venez., arts. 9.1, 9.4, Oct. 22, 1991,
1788 U.N.T.S. 70, 74-75.
64 On this problem, see Aron Broches, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties
and Arbitration of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 63, 68-69 (Jan C.
Schultsz & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 1982) (concluding that an investor who
wants to rely on a host state's consent expressed in an investment protection
20061
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When a host state has expressed its consent to ICSID
arbitration, an investor can formally manifest its consent to accept
by simply initiating the ICSID arbitration. Then, article 25 of the
ICSID Convention provides that such consent be considered
permanent once it has been given. At this point, the arbitration
agreement is definitively concluded. 65 Obviously, an investor's
acceptance must precisely correspond to the host state's offer,
respecting the established forms, conditions, terms, and limitations
therein. 66 If neither the relevant international treaty nor domestic
law requires formal acceptance, an investor can accept a host
state's offer by written notice. 67
5. THE ESSENCE OF ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRVITY
In order to describe this phenomenon, scholars use the concept
of "arbitration without privity." 68 Basically, this concept expresses
the right of the investor to initiate arbitration against the host state
treaty should therefore promptly signify his own consent in order to assure
irrevocability).
65 Article 25 of the ICSID Convention requires "consent in writing" by host
states. ICSID Convention, supra note 48, art. 25; see SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 207
("The investor may express its acceptance in a variety of ways other than
instituting proceedings. These include an investment agreement with the host
State, a simple communication to the host State that consent to ICSID jurisdiction
in accordance with the legislation is accepted...."); see also Aron Broches,
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Some Observations on
Jurisdiction, 5 COLUM. J. TRANSN'L L. 263, 269 (1966) (discussing the binding effect
of consent once it has been given); Broches, supra note 59, at 352 (describing the
ICSID Convention's consent requirements).
66 See S. Pac. Prop. Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction,
Nov. 27, 1985 (ICSID Arb. Trib.), reprinted in 16 Y.B. COM. ARB. 28 (1991).
67 See SCHREUER, supra note 50, at 210 (arguing that written notice in the
absence of formal consent requirements is acceptable because it allows for
maximum flexibility).
68 The expression "arbitration without privity" was first used by Jan
Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 232, 232
(1995). See also Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, in THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY: AN EAST-WEST GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT & TRADE 422, 422-423 (T.W.
Walde ed., 1996) ("This new world of arbitration is one where the claimant need
not have a contractual relationship with the defendant, and where the tables could
not be turned; the defendant could not have initiated the arbitration, nor is it
certain of being able even to bring a counterclaim."); Ahmed Sadek E1-Kosheri,
ICSID Arbitration and Developing Countries, 8 ICSID REV. -FOREIGN INV. L.J. 104,
106 (1993) (describing this phenomenon in terms of "new techniques [that in
recent years] have emerged [and that] are theoretically conceivable under the




without a previous arbitration agreement. Therefore, this situation
seems to have effected a recent evolution of international law
whereby individuals become entitled to enjoy benefits, rights, and
guarantees established in international law norms. These norms
give individuals the ability to enforce these obligations that
international law places on states.69  The advantages of this
situation are clear. From a policy standpoint, states will be
induced to respect their obligations under international treaties.
And from an economic perspective, foreign investors can initiate
arbitration without being forced to negotiate an arbitration
agreement or global contract, thus saving time and money.
Accordingly, laws recognizing arbitration attract more foreign
investments than laws lacking arbitration clauses.
A correct reconstruction of the concept of "arbitration without
privity" requires some preliminary remarks. First, when analyzing
the international laws by which this concept has been built, it
seems that the content of article 25 of the ICSID Convention
represents a formal source of consent. As the consent of the state
to arbitration originates in this norm, this is also where the original
consent of the state to be compelled to arbitration is derived.
Consequently, a national law granting arbitration does not bind a
state that has not ratified the ICSID Convention.
This limitation is illustrated by the decision of the ICSID
arbitration tribunal in the case of Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of
Indonesia.70 In that case, the plaintiff asked the ICSID tribunal to
69 With regard to the consent to ICSID jurisdiction as contained in the ECT,
Thomas W. Walde observes:
In instituting such compulsory jurisdiction... [the] negotiators/drafters
must have - or should have had - in mind the idea of using individuals'
complaints as a measure of enforcing the Treaty's law, a thought that is
familiar to domestic legal systems .... [H]ere, the individual plaintiff...
is seen as an instrument to achieve compliance, albeit motivated mainly
by self-interest- the "invisible hand" uses the self-interested plaintiff to
achieve the higher purposes of the law.
Thomas W. Walde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty -From
Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation, 12 ARB. INT'L 429, 445 (1996). For an
argument in favor of applying these norms directly to individuals, see Patrick
Juillard, Les conventions bilat~rales d'investissement conclues par la France [Bilateral
Investment Treaties Concluded by France], 106 J.D.I. 274, 289 (1979) (Fr.); Stem, supra
note 49, at 240; Bastid-Burdeau, supra note 62, at 17-21.
70 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, Sept.
25, 1983 (ICSID Arb. Trib.), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984); see also SCHREUER, The
ICSID Convention, supra note 50, at 206 (providing a brief summary of the
tribunal's decision.); Christopher T. Curtis, Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of
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declare its jurisdiction over Indonesia. According to article 23.5 of
the Indonesian Law of 1967, "if no agreement can be reached
between the two parties regarding the amount, type and procedure
for payment of compensation, arbitration shall take place which
shall be binding on both parties." On this point, the arbitration
tribunal considered that:
[n]o mention is made of the ICSID arbitration in this
provision, and indeed could not have been made, since at
the time of enactment of that law, the Convention had not
entered into force in respect of Indonesia... that means
necessarily that article 23 of Law no. 1 of 1967 is not and can
not be a direct and sufficient commitment to submit
investment disputes to ICSID arbitration.71
Also, the ICSID Convention will be applied according to the
specific manner used by the state to give its consent. This means
that the host state has to verify the actual existence of either a norm
of internal law or an international treaty expressing the mentioned
consent.72 Furthermore, the choice of using national law instead of
an international treaty is not without consequences under
international law. In fact, when exclusively dealing with national
laws, one must ascertain whether the state has or has not revoked
its consent in any way; by contrast, when applying the rules of an
international treaty, it would be enough to verify the entry into
force of the treaty because a unilateral withdrawal would
constitute a violation of the state's international obligations
according to international law.
Indonesia, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 106, 106-112 (1989) (providing a summary of the
case); Robert N. Hornick, Indonesian Arbitration in Theory and Practice, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 559, 579 (1991) (mentioning Amco Asia Corp. as an example of
government arbitration).
71 Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 367-68.
72 Obviously, the treaty must be entered into force. See, e.g., Tradex Hellas
S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Decision on Jurisdiction, Dec. 24, 1996, 14 ICSID
REv. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 161, 178 (1999) (requiring the agreement be entered "into
force thirty days after the date on which the Contracting Parties have informed
each other.., of its ratification or approval"); Cekoslovenska Obchodni Banka,
A.S. v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 24, 1999, 14 ICSID REV. -
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 251, 264 (1999) (declaring that because neither claimant nor
respondent offered proof that the BIT was entered into force the tribunal could




6. ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY CONSTRAINS THE KREMLIN
The Russian Federation, like fifty-one other countries, is a
contracting party to the Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT"), the major
international instrument regarding the sector of energy sources,
concluded in Lisbon in December 1994 and entered into force in
April 1998. 73 Actually, the Russian Federation has not proceeded
with the ratification of this treaty,74 but it has consented to its
provisional application, in line with article 45 of the treaty.75
Part 3 of the ECT merges several provisions concerning the
protection of foreign investments. First of all, the application of
national treatment, as well as the clause for most-favored nations,
is guaranteed.76 Second, foreign investments:
73 ECT, supra note 61. The European Community is a contracting party to the
ECT by ratification on December 16, 1997. For a discussion of the links between
the ECT and international trade, see generally Olivia Q. Swaak-Goldman, The
Energy Charter Treaty and Trade: A Guide to the Labyrinth, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1996, at 115; Craig S. Bamberger, An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty, in THE
ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra note 68, at 1, 1-34; Peter Muchlinski, The Energy
Charter Treaty: Towards a New International Order for Trade and Investment or a Case
of History Repeating Itself?, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra note 68, at 205,
205-25; and Loma Brazell, The Energy Charter Treaty: Some Observations on its
International Context and Internal Structure, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra
note 68, at 226, 226-39.
74 According to information available on the ECT website, the Russian
Parliament ("the Duma") would ratify the ECT soon. See Russian Parliament
Considers Ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty, CHARTER NEWS (Energy Charter
Secretariat, Brussels, Belg.), Spring 2001, at 1, available at http://www.
encharter.org/upload/1/Charter%20News%20issue%206%20-%20Mar%2001.pdf.
The Russian national procedures for the provisional application of treaties
provide that the Duma enacs a specific law -article 23 of the Federal Law on the
ratification of treaties. TREATY MAKING - EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE
BOUND BY A TREATY 83-86, 242 (Council of Europe & British Inst. of Int'l & Comp.
Law eds., 2001).
75 Article 44 of the ECT provides that "[the] treaty shall enter into force on the
ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification."
ECT, supra note 61, art. 44.1. However, according to article 45, the signatory party
automatically agrees to a provisional application of the treaty, id. art. 45.1, unless
it deposits a declaration, id. art. 45.2(a), and in this case, neither the state nor the
investor can claim the benefits accorded by the provisional application of the
Treaty, id. art. 45.2(b). At any rate, even when the declaration has been deposited
by the state, part 7 of the ECT concerning the institutional structure of the ECT
can be applied. Id. art. 45.2(c). On the coincidence of Russian interests with the
interests protected by the ECT, see Andrew Seck, Investing in the Former Soviet
Union's Oil Industry: The Energy Charter Treaty and its Implication for Mitigating
Political Risk, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY, supra note 68, at 110, 110-34; Andrei
A. Konoplyanik, The Energy Charter Treaty: A Russian Perspective, in THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY, supra note 68, at 156, 156-78.
76 Article 10.7 of the ECT states:
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shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a
measure or measures having effect equivalent to
nationalization or expropriation ... except where such
[e]xpropriation is: (a) for a purpose which is in the public
interest; (b) not discriminatory; (c) carried out under due
process of law; and (d) accompanied by the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 77
Compensation amounting to the "fair market value of the
Investment expropriated at the time immediately before the
Expropriation or impending Expropriation" 78 can be claimed
before a national tribunal. 79 In order to avoid any doubts, it is
expressly provided that expropriations include even those
situations in which the expropriated subject is a corporation or an
enterprise with investments by foreign investors (including foreign
ownership of shares).80
Part 5 of the ECT is assigned to the settlement of disputes. The
key provision is article 26. This article provides that when an
Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of
Investors of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities
including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal,
treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments of
its own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or
any third state and their related activities including management,
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most
favourable.
ECT, supra note 61, art. 10.7. The Conference of the Signatory Parties attached to
the ECT a declaration containing the Decisions With Respect To the Energy
Charter Treaty. Id. Annex 2. According to this declaration, with respect to article
10.7, "[tjhe Russian Federation may require that companies with foreign
participation obtain legislative approval for the leasing of federally-owned
property, provided that the Russian Federation shall ensure without exception
that this process is not applied in a manner which discriminates among
Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties." Id. Annex 2, para. 2.
77 ECT, supra note 61, art. 13.1.
78 Id.
79 The norm concerning expropriations is article 13. See Thomas W. Wilde,
International Investment Under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, in THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY, supra note 68, at 251, 299-303 (discussing how the treaty
introduces the concept of "fair market value" and how it sets the valuation date
for expropriation).
80 According to article 13.3, "[flor the avoidance of doubt, Expropriation shall
include situations where a Contracting Party expropriates the assets of a company
or enterprise in its Area in which an Investor of any other Contracting Party has





initial noncontentious phase ends, 81 the investor can file an action
either in the national courts of the host state or "in accordance with
any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure"
according to paragraphs 3 to 8.82 It is important to highlight that
according to paragraph 3, each contracting party of the ECT
(except for the states listed in Annex 1A) "gives unconditional
consent" to refer to arbitration before an international tribunal. In
this case, the initiation of arbitration is precluded if the investor
has already commenced an action before the national courts or an
arbitration tribunal based on an arbitration clause. However, the
Russian Federation is listed therein.83 Once the investor has
decided to initiate arbitration, he must choose one of the following
arbitration proceedings:
(a) an arbitration tribunal constituted according to ICSID
rules;
(b) the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, when either the
host state or the investor's national state is not a
Contracting Party of the ICSID Convention;
(c) a sole arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal established
according to the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") rules; or
(d) an arbitral proceeding according to the rules of the
Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm.84
81 See ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.1 ("Disputes between a Contracting Party
and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the
latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation
of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.").
82 ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.2(b).
83 ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.3 ("Subject only to subparagraphs (b) and (c),
each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission
of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.... The Contracting Parties listed in Annex ID do not
give such unconditional consent where the investor has previously submitted the
dispute under subparagraph (2)(a) or (b) [i.e., before the national courts or
according to the arbitration established by a contractual clause]."). The rationale
for this norm lies in the states' worry that investors could use arbitration
proceedings to appeal the decisions of national courts. See Wilde, supra note 69,
at 457 (discussing the concern that arbitration would provide an appeal against
judgments by national courts and the resulting compromise formulated in article
26.3(b) of Annex ID).
84 ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.4; see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Arbitration
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Arbitration shall take place, at the request of a party, in a state
that has signed the New York Convention of 195885 according to
the applicable treaties and the principles of international law.86 At
that point the final verdict shall be effective and executive. 87 As far
as the residual matters are concerned, article 10.1 of the ECT states
that a "Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has
entered into with an Investor or an investment of an Investor of
any other Contracting Party."
This provision contains a norm of international law that
requires the states to respect, in good faith, its obligations
contracted into foreign investors.88 In the ECT system, this norm
can be excluded from arbitration according to article 26.3(c) that
contains an opt-out clause: in doing so, arbitration cannot be
extended to violations of article 10.1 by the host state when the
same claim has already been filed before national courts.
89
A first remark on article 26 of the ECT regards the statement of
"unconditional consent," cited above: this can be considered an
"offer" given by the state to the foreign investor in order to
Provisions in the BITs and the Energy Charter Treaty, in THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY,
supra note 68, at 409, 416-18 (discussing the mechanisms of arbitration available
for investors to choose).
85 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739 [hereinafter New York
Convention]; see ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.5(b) ("Any arbitration under this
Article shall at the request of any party to the dispute be held in a state that is a
party to the New York Convention."); see also Vandevelde, supra note 84, at 418
("The Treaty requires that... the arbitration be held in a state that is a party to the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, commonly known as the New York Convention.").
86 ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.6.
87 Id. art. 26.8.
88 See G.A. Res. 1803, 8, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc.
A/5217, at 15 (Dec. 14, 1962) ("Foreign investment agreements freely entered into,
by or between sovereign States shall be observed in good faith."); Walde, supra
note 69, at 455 ("[AIlI contractual obligations ... arising out of other contracts or
quasi-contractual licences relating to an investment (pre-contractual agreements;
obligations stemming from authorizations generating obligations for the host
state, e.g. petroleum exploration and production licences, but probably also
licences authorizing, for example, energy generation or transmission) are covered,
be they of a primarily commercial law or administrative law nature.").
89 ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.3(c) ("A Contracting Party listed in Annex IA
does not give such unconditional respect to a dispute arising under the last
sentence of Article 10(1)."). The Russian Federation did not reserve its consent
according to this opt-out clause. But clearly it is irrelevant, because Russia does
not allow investors, as in article 26.3(b)(i) of the ECT, to initiate arbitration when
the dispute has been already claimed before national courts.
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conclude an arbitration agreement. This surely represents a big
change.
Furthermore, the consent of the state applies not only to the
arbitration institutions mentioned above, but also the relation to
the New York Convention of 1958. Therefore, the states signing
the New York Convention will have to make the consent totally
effective. 90
Finally, the state's consent can be given without the host state
having to undersign either the ICSID Convention or a bilateral
treaty with the national state of the investor. In this case the ICSID
Additional Facility Rules have to be applied when one of the
parties-i.e., the investor or the host state-has not undersigned
the ICSID Convention.91 Consequently the consent expressed by
the state through article 26 of the ECT is effective even though
other instruments are not in use. This undoubtedly represents an
extremely practical realization of "arbitration without privity" in
the energy sector. Thus, "arbitration without privity" can be
applied to the Yukos case: in fact, the ECT gives the investor a new
and useful instrument to initiate arbitration even without a specific
arbitration agreement.
This solution can be confirmed by reading article 26.1, which
establishes a hierarchy between the proceedings activated before
national courts and the international arbitration procedure. An
investor is able to file his complaints in national courts and,
subsequently, initiate arbitration before one of the mentioned
institutions. When the opt-out clause is not exercised, the treaty
sets up an "appeal body" against such national courts' decisions,
90 See New York Convention, supra note 85, art. 2 (stipulating that all
contracting states must, "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them
in accordance with the rules and procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon."); Olivia Q. Swaak-Goldman, The Dispute Resolution Procedures of the
Energy Charter Treaty: Made to Measure, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 317, 321 (1995)
(discussing the ECT investor-to-state dispute resolution mechanism).
91 See generally Aron Broches, The "Additional Facility" of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 4 Y.B. COM. ARB. 373 (1979)
(providing a commentary to and clarification of the Additional Facility Rules of
ICSID); Edward R. Leahy & Diane F. Orentlicher, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Issued by the Additional Facility of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), 2 J. INT'L ARB. 15 (1985) (discussing the issue of whether awards
resulting from arbitrations of the Additional Facility can be enforced under
existing American legislation); Pierluigi Toriello, The Additional Facility of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 4 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 59
(1978-79) (analyzing criticisms to and praises of the creation of the Additional
Facility for ICSID arbitrations).
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albeit on the limited grounds listed in part 3 of the treaty.92
One can certainly argue that this solution opens the system to
the danger of conflicts between decisions and cases of international
lis pendens.
To finish, there exists a specific norm in regard to tax disputes.
On this topic, article 21.5 of the ECT entitles an investor to initiate
arbitration in order to determine whether a fiscal measure
constitutes an expropriation according to article 13.93 In this case,
the fiscal authorities of the host state are given precedence and
have to reach a decision within six months after the dispute
arises.94 At any rate, arbitration can be initiated according to article
26, and arbitrators will have to consider the previous judgment of
the fiscal authorities 95 to finally make their decision.
92 Walde, supra note 69, at 460.
93 The ECT states that "Article 13 shall apply to taxes." ECT, supra note 61,
art. 21.5(a).
94 Concerning this matter, article 21.5(b) of the ECT provides:
Whenever an issue arises under Article 13, to the extent it pertains to
whether a tax constitutes an expropriation or whether a tax alleged to
constitute an expropriation is discriminatory, the following provisions
shall apply:
(i) The Investor or the Contracting Party alleging expropriation
shall refer the issue of whether the tax is an expropriation or
whether the tax is discriminatory to the relevant Competent Tax
Authority. Failing such referral by the Investor or the Contracting
Party, bodies called upon to settle disputes pursuant to Article
26(2)(c) or 27(2) shall make a referral to the relevant Competent Tax
Authorities;
(ii) The Competent Tax Authorities shall, within a period of six
months of such referral, strive to resolve the issues so referred.
Where non-discrimination issues are concerned, the Competent Tax
Authorities shall apply the non-discrimination provisions of the
relevant tax convention or, if there is no non-discrimination
provision in the relevant tax convention applicable to the tax or no
such tax convention is in force between the Contracting Parties
concerned, they shall apply the non-discrimination principles under
the Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Id. art 21.5(b); see also Swaak-Goldman, supra note 90, at 332 (discussing the
provisions for taxation).
95 The ECT provides:
(iii) Bodies called upon to settle disputes pursuant to Article 26(2)(c) or
27(2) may take into account any conclusions arrived at by the Competent
Tax Authorities regarding whether the tax is an expropriation. Such
bodies shall take into account any conclusions arrived at within the six-
month period prescribed in subparagraph (b)(ii) by the Competent Tax
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7. CAN YUKOS INITIATE AN ARBITRATION AGAINST RUSSIA?
Thus, what is the actual significance of article 10 of the 1999
Law on Foreign Investment? Counsel for Yukos tried to
demonstrate, through arguments, that the mentioned article 10
constitutes an offer to arbitrate. Yukos would have accepted this
offer by using arbitration against the Russian Federation,96 thus,
completing an arbitration agreement, which would have also
supported the use of the New York Convention of 1958 on the
validation and enforcement of the arbitration norms.
Although provocative, this solution is not at all convincing.
First, it seems too extreme to consider article 10 an expression of
the Russian Federation's consent to be bound by arbitration,
especially considering the ICSID cases cited above. In fact,
according to the aforementioned international jurisprudence, the
Authorities regarding whether the tax is discriminatory. Such bodies
may also take into account any conclusions arrived at by the Competent
Tax Authorities after the expiry of the six-month period;
(iv) Under no circumstances shall involvement of the Competent Tax
Authorities, beyond the end of the six-month period referred to in
subparagraph (b)(ii), lead to a delay of proceedings under Articles 26
and 27.
ECT, supra note 61, art 21.5(b).
96 Yukos contended that, starting from article 10 of the 1999 Law on Foreign
Investment:
35. There are no limitations on the scope of the Russian
Government's consent to arbitration. Moreover, by its terms, Article 10
does not require any additional agreement for the Russian Government's
consent to be operative. As noted above, under the Russian Foreign
Investment Law, Yukos is guaranteed the same investment protections,
including those provided in Article 10, as a foreign investor, based on its
significant percentage of foreign ownership. Yukos, therefore, is entitled
to submit its investment disputes with the Russian Government to
international arbitration.
36. With the Russian Government's consent in Article 10 of the
Russian Foreign Investment Law to submit investment disputes to
international arbitration, all that is required is the investor's acceptance
of the offer to arbitrate. That an offer to submit investment disputes to
international arbitration, which is set forth in a national investment law,
can be accepted by a notice of arbitration is now widely recognized ....
38. This Notice of Arbitration, together with the Russian
Government's consent to international arbitration contained in Article 10
of the Russian Foreign Investment Law, constitutes a binding and
enforceable arbitration agreement ....
Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 28, at 14-15.
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norms of internal laws and international treaties expressing
consent of the state were definitely more detailed than article 10 of
the Russian Law. The internal laws and international treaties call
to mind the ICSID Convention of 1965, while article 10 generically
refers to the "international treaties of the Russian Federation." 97
Moreover, one must consider that Russia has not ratified the ICSID
Convention.98 This circumstance is parallel to the dispute arising
in the Amco case, where the ICSID tribunal refused to retain
jurisdiction.99 In fact, even though the Indonesian law permitted
the investor to initiate arbitration, this could not be considered a
proper expression of the state consent considering Indonesia had
not ratified the ICSID Convention.100 From this standpoint, article
10 cannot be considered an expression of Russia's consent because
the very jurisdiction permitting arbitration comes from a
convention that has not been ratified by Russia.
The solution is the same achieved in the bilateral treaties
presently ratified by the Russian Federation. Only eleven of the
thirty-two treaties regarding the protection of foreign investments
concluded by Russia have entered into force. The treaty with the
United States is among those that have not entered into force.101
97 1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, art. 10.
98 The Russian Federation signed the ICSID Convention on June 16, 1992.
ICSID Convention, supra note 33.
99 Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, Sept.
25, 1983 (ICSID Arb. Trib.), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984).
100 See sources cited supra note 70.
101 A list of the bilateral treaties is available on the ICSID website: The World
Bank Group, ICSID, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1996 (1996), http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/treaties.htm. Actually, Russia concluded
and ratified eleven bilateral treaties with the following states: Belgium and
Luxembourg (Agreement Concerning the Promotion and the Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Belg.-Lux.-U.S.S.R., Feb. 9, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 302 (1990));
Canada (Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Can.-U.S.S.R., Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION TREATIES (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Release No 93-3,
1993)); Finland (Agreement for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of
Investments, Fin.-U.S.S.R., Feb. 8, 1989, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND
PROTECTION TREATIES, supra); France (Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, July 4, 1989, Fr.-U.S.S.R, July 4, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 320
(1990)); Germany (Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., June 13, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 352 (1990));
Italy (Converno della Republica Italiana e il Governo dell'Union delle Republiche
Socialiste Sovietiche Sulla Promozione e Reciproca Protezione Degli Investimenti
[Convention for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Italy-
U.S.S.R., Nov. 30, 1989, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION




Moreover, none of those treaties regards a national state of any
Yukos shareholder. The only pertinent treaty, concluded with the
United Kingdom in 1989 and in use since 1991, does not apply to
Gibraltar, the place where the Menatep Group was founded.
10 2
By contrast, a positive solution derives solely from the Energy
Charter Treaty, which is concretely applicable in the Yukos case.
In this treaty, Russia gave its consent to the application of the ECT.
Thus, by article 26, Russia offers to foreign investors the right to
initiate arbitration. Such an offer is only revocable by Russia if it
withdraws from the ECT. Once the investor accepts these
conditions, the arbitration agreement is concluded. Referring to
article 26 of the ECT, Yukos is thus entitled to initiate arbitration
against the Russian Federation.
This solution had previously been proposed to the Houston
court by one of the experts called by the parties, Professor Thomas
Walde, who correctly observed that "Articles 8, 10, and 4.5 and the
preamble of the [Russian Federation's 1999 Law on Foreign
Investment] create a right of arbitration for Yukos... [and] that the
Energy Charter Treaty requires submission by Russia to
international arbitration with respect to investment disputes."
103
Walde testified that "[a]ny other way would subject an investor to
Protection of Investments, S. Korea-U.S.S.R., Dec. 14, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 762 (1991));
Netherlands (Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Neth.-U.S.S.R., Oct. 5, 1989, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AND PROTECTION TREATIES, supra); Spain (Convenio de Fomento y Protecci6n
Reciproca de Inversiones [Convention for Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments], Spain-U.S.S.R., Oct. 26, 1990, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION
AND PROTECTION TREATIES, supra); United Kingdom (Agreement for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.K.-U.S.S.R., Apr. 6, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 369
(1990) [hereinafter U.K.-U.S.S.R. Agreement]); Switzerland (Accord concernant la
promotion et la protection r6ciproque des investissements [Agreement
Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Switz.-
U.S.S.R., Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in 3 INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
TREATIES, supra).
102 In fact, the treaty concluded on June 17, 1992, but the United States has
still not entered it into force. On this treaty, see Black, supra note 31, at 136. See
also U.K.-U.S.S.R. Agreement, supra note 101, art. 1(e)(i) (outlining what lands the
term "territory" within the agreement includes). Concerning this treaty, article 8.3
states that investors "shall have the right to refer the dispute either to: (a) the
Institute of Arbitration of the Chamber of Commerce of Stockholm; or (b) an
international arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal to be appointed by a special
agreement or established under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law." Id. art. 8.3.
103 In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 405 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
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the vagaries of politically dominated opponents." 104
It remains to be examined whether any serious obstacle
opposes the full implementation of this solution. The question
rests on two issues. The first regards the effect of international law
norms. In Russia, it does not seem to be a real problem that the
ECT has received a temporary application. Usually the only limit
to provisional applications is the existence of national
constitutional provisions inconsistent with the norms of the treaties
according to article 45.1.105 However, this is not the case here. In
fact, "in case[s] of anticipated application, the conventional regime
is then applied." 106
The second issue concerns the inability to contradict the fiscal
nature of the concrete complaint of pending disputes. Article 21.5
of the ECT, as observed above, expressly provides the possibility to
initiate arbitration on disputes involving fiscal issues.107 Therefore,
based on this norm, arbitration will be as useful as it is necessary to
ascertain whether a fiscal measure constitutes an expropriation
under the ECT.108
Moreover, one cannot object that the disputes between Yukos
and the Russian Government have been decided already by
Russian courts, and as a result, arbitration is precluded by the opt-
out clause signed by the Russian Federation under article 26.3(b)(i)
of the ECT.109 Rather, it seems that the preclusion applies only to
104 Id.
105 See discussion supra note 75.
106 Wilde skillfully describes this situation. According to the author, the
investment arbitration provision of article 26.1 in conjunction with the provisional
application provision of article 45 "means that governments have, using their
existing executive powers in this field, effectively and with immediate effect made
the required 'offer' of investment arbitration which becomes effective once
investors agree to it .... The signature of the Treaty.. . implies an irrevocable
offer to current and prospective investors to accept Treaty arbitration .... The only
defence for governments is therefore that submission to international arbitration
would be 'ultra vires,' i.e. not authorized by national law." Walde, supra note 69,
at 463 (first emphasis added).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 81-85 (describing the mechanics
through which investment disputes are resolved in the ICSID).
108 On the possibility of initiating arbitration on taxes, when they concern a
foreign investment, see Bernard Hanotiau, L'arbitrabiliti, 296 RECUEIL DES COURS
24, 171 (2002) (Fr.); Ibrahim Fadlallah, Arbitrage international et litiges fiscaux, 2001
REV. ARB. 299, 308 (Fr.).
109 See ECT, supra note 61, art. 26.3(a) (excepting contracting parties that have
previously submitted the dispute under subparagraph (2)(a) or (b) from the ECT
default rule that "each Contracting Party hereby gives its unconditional consent to




disputes which have been already judged by national courts, and
are limited to the complaint before those courts. 110 Clearly, under
the opt-out clause, complaints already submitted to national courts
cannot be arbitrated, but this barrier operates only if the disputes
submitted to arbitration and those submitted to national courts
concern the same pleading. On the contrary, a dispute having an
original, previously unexamined pleading can be submitted to
arbitration.
This is the issue involving Yukos. The disputes brought before
Russian courts represent mere objections to the tax claims against
Yukos. By contrast, the request for arbitration concerns alleged
expropriations or supposed violations of the obligations owed to
the state as a result of international treaties and customary law."'
It appears clear that the complaints are different.
To conclude, nothing seems to bar the application of the
arbitration without privity doctrine in the Yukos case. Thanks to
the ECT, Yukos is entitled to enjoy an unquestionable right to
initiate arbitration that can be activated by the investor through a
simple expression of consent to arbitrate the dispute. This raises
the question of what consequences would follow from the
adoption of this doctrine in the Houston bankruptcy court
proceedings.
8. YUKOS IN TEXAS
Once it has been established that an arbitration agreement
exists between Yukos and the Russian Federation, one can argue
that the Houston court must automatically enforce this agreement.
However, it is useful to make some preliminary remarks about the
concrete complaint of the pending dispute between the parties. On
the one hand, one cannot forget that this complaint regards a
110 Id. The norm refers to the case when "the Investor has previously
submitted the dispute" to the national courts or a consensual arbitration. Id. art.
26(c)(b)(i) (emphasis added).
111 One can consider the paradoxical character of article 10 of the Russian
Federation's 1999 Law on Foreign Investment: On one hand, that provision gives
the investor the right to initiate arbitration under applicable treaties and laws.
1999 Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 33, art. 10. While on the other hand,
the Russian Federation has not given its unconditional consent to the use of
arbitration procedure, through the opt-out clause provided by article 26.3(b)(i) of
the ECT, annulling de facto the right to arbitration of the investor who has
previously filed a claim before the national courts. ECT, supra note 61, art.
26.3(b)(i).
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bankruptcy proceeding. Can the bankruptcy court use arbitration
in a dispute that has arisen between the debtor and one of its
creditors? On the other hand, if one of the parties involved in the
arbitration is a sovereign state, is the creditor quid juris subject to
the court's order to compel arbitration in a foreign state?
In answering these questions one must consider that in the
United States, jurisprudence and scholars affirm that bankruptcy
courts have the discretion to submit a dispute to arbitration after
having assessed the interests involved therein." 2 Thus, there is no
question about the concrete possibility of the bankruptcy judge
compelling parties to international arbitration.
Second, regarding the sovereignty of foreign states, one should
remember that sovereign immunity usually does not apply to
arbitration.1" 3 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act states that a
112 Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (current version at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000)), the Supreme
Court ruled that the arbitration proceedings, based on the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925), prevail on all other provisions
of statutory law. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). Subsequently,
a lively debate arose among scholars and in the jurisprudence about the eligibility
of arbitration in bankruptcy proceedings. See, e.g., William E. Dietrick, The
Conflicting Policies Between Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33, 36 (1984)
(proposing a solution to the conflict between the Arbitration Act and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978); Mette Kurth, An Unstoppable Mandate and an
Immovable Policy: The Arbitration Act and the Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 999, 1028 (1996) (proposing a way to reconcile the policies of the Arbitration
Act with the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code); Fred Neufeld, Enforcement
of Contractual Arbitration Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
525 (1991) (discussing the interplay of the Bankruptcy Code and the Arbitration
Act in American jurisprudence); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming Encounter:
International Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 MINN. L. REV. 595 (1983) (attempting to
reconcile the conflicting bankruptcy and international arbitration policies); Mark
D. Yochum, Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy: A Mutant is Loose (Again!),
Symptoms Are Showing, a Palliative Is Suggested, 19 STETSON L. REV. 137, 142 (1989)
("The body part which is in the processes of being most firmly infected is the law
of the effect of arbitration provisions in prepetition arrangements with putative
bankrupts."); Carolyn C. Markason, Note, Arbitration Agreement in Bankruptcy
Proceedings: The Class Between Policies and Proper Forum for Resolution, 57 TEMP.
L.Q. 855 (1984) (commenting on the leading case on this topic, Zimmerman v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1983), which reads: "because of
the importance of bankruptcy proceedings in general, and the need for the
expeditious resolution of bankruptcy matters in particular, we hold that the
intentions of Congress will be better realized if the Bankruptcy Reform Act is read
to modify the Arbitration Act").
113 See Riccardo Luzzatto, International Commercial Arbitration and the
Municipal Law of States, 157 RECUEIL DES COURS 13, 93 (1977) ("There should be...
no doubt... that an agreement to arbitrate constitutes an implicit waiver and that




foreign state is deprived of its immunity not only when the
arbitration is initiated because of an arbitration agreement (e.g., if
the New York Convention is applied)1u 4 but also when the dispute
concerns the alleged expropriation of U.S. investors' assets
abroad.115
Moreover, it is important to note that the existence of an
arbitration agreement between the parties produces some
significant results. First, article 2, paragraph 3 of the New York
Convention states that:
[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action
in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration,
unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed.
11 6
not apply.").
114 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FSIA], contains the
fundamental norms of this topic and generally establishes that foreign states
remain immune from the U.S. courts' jurisdiction, except when an express
exclusionary rule applies. Before the 1988 amendment, FSIA did not provide for
the case of an arbitration clause between an individual and a foreign state;
however, the fact that the foreign state had signed the New York Convention
constituted an implied waiver to immunity. Actually, since section 1605(a)(6) of
FSIA applies, it is required either that arbitration take place in the United States
or, alternatively, that the foreign state is a party to an international treaty
concerning arbitration clauses or awards relevant in that specific case. Cargill
Int'l S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993); see George Kahale,
III, Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waivers of Jurisdictional Immunity, 14
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29 (1981) (discussing the issue of whether an arbitration of
choice-of-law clause may be construed as a waiver of jurisdictional immunity);
Paul A. Pavlis, Note, International Arbitration and the Inapplicability of the Act of State
Doctrine, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 65 (1981) (examining the feasibility and legal
ramifications of extending the act of state doctrine to deny the arbitrability of an
investment dispute following a foreign expropriation); Gary B. Sullivan,
Comment, Implicit Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by Consent to Arbitration:
Territorial Scope and Procedural Limits, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329 (1983) (analyzing the
scope of an implied waiver by arbitration agreement under FSIA). On this point,
one must specify that American courts consider adequate that the state is a party
to the New York Convention.
115 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000); see George Kahale, III, Characterizing
Nationalizations for Purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of
State Doctrine, 6 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 391 (1983) (reviewing the traditional approach
to nationalizations and assessing the new theories in light of FSIA and case law).
116 New York Convention, supra note 85, art. 2. This so-called negative effect
of the arbitration agreement clearly shows the process efficiency of this contract:
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As a result, the Houston bankruptcy court would be able to
refer the parties to arbitration only after ascertaining that the
conditions requested by the norm were realized. On this matter,
section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1976 provides that "[a]
court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that
arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place
therein provided for, whether that place is within or without the
United States."11 7
This provision contains four issues that are very relevant in the
present case. First, the courts called to compel arbitration must
have jurisdiction over the parties according to the general
principles and doctrines. Second, the New York Convention of
1958 must be applied."18 Third, it is not a problem that section 206
the hybrid nature of the arbitration agreement appears in its process dimension,
not its jurisdictional dimension, by prohibiting the courts and judges from
deciding the same case. Jos6 Carlos Fernandez Rozas, Le r6le des juridictions
6tatiques devant l'arbitrage commercial international, 290 RECUEIL DES COuRS 72, 78
(2001) (Fr.); see also 2 PHILLIPPE FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL 116 (1965) (Fr.). The first two paragraphs of article 2 of the New
York Convention state:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a
contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained
in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
New York Convention, supra note 85, art. 2. On this article, see DOMENINCO DI
PIETRO & IARTIN PLATITE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AWARDS:
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 104 (2001).
117 9 U.S.C. § 206 (2000).
118 See Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 1982)
(explaining the analysis that is necessary for determining whether or not
arbitration falls under the scope of the Convention). Section 202 of the Federal
Arbitration Act provides that:
[a]n arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in
section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An agreement or
award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad,
envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. For the purpose of
this section a corporation is a citizen of the United States if it is
incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United States.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/3
ARBITRATION WITHOUT PRIVITY
provides that the court may refer disputes to arbitration, while in
contrast, article 2.3 of the Convention establishes that national
courts shall grant the arbitration motion." 9 In fact, U.S. courts
made clear that they are undoubtedly bound to initiate arbitration
according to the favor arbitrati, which characterizes the Federal
Arbitration Act.1 20 Finally, the referred arbitration must take place
in the venue chosen by the parties, even if located abroad. If a
specific venue for the arbitration agreement is not chosen, courts
rule that arbitration will take place in the district where the filing
occurred. 2
1
At this point, one should remember nevertheless that it could
be very difficult to compel arbitration against the Russian
Federation before a U.S. court. Russia is a sovereign state and the
Yukos affair implies important issues related to Russian politics
and its economy. The Russian government is strictly involved in
the world oil market and it would not be diplomatically and
politically dignified for Russia to be judged by a foreign court. For
these reasons, an international arbitration would be the best
solution for resolving Yukos's claims.
The Houston bankruptcy court did not decide that Yukos must
be compelled to arbitration. As noted above,122 the court decided
to dismiss the case for other reasons.123 Certainly, this would have
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
119 See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, at 135 (1981) (discussing the omission of the word "shall" in one edition as a
typographical error); see also MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION LAW 250 (1989) (discussing the problems with having measures
decided by the parties or by the judge's discretion).
120 [S]o long as parties are bound to arbitrate and district court has
personal jurisdiction over them, the court is under an unflagging,
nondiscretionary duty to grant a timely motion to compel arbitration and
thereby enforce the New York Convention... even though the agreement
in question requires arbitration in a distant forum.
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003).
121 Section 206 does not allow parties to initiate arbitration if they did not
agree on the arbitration's venue. In Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat'l Mach. & Equip.
Import & Export Corp., 819 F.2d 247, 250 (9th Cir. 1987), the district court noted that
"[iln the absence of a term specifying location, a district court can only order
arbitration within its district" since "section 206 does not permit a court to
designate a foreign forum when the agreement fails to designate a place."
122 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
123 There is only one reference to arbitration -except for the experts'
references -in the In re Yukos Oil Co. opinion "[b]ecause the court has concluded
that the instant case is to be dismissed, the court does not reach the question of
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been a good opportunity to know the court's opinion on some of
the issues described in this Article. It is curious, however, that in
her final decision, Judge Clark refers to both the ECT and the
prospect that under a different forum, the process would be
conducted with complete involvement of the Russian Federation.
This suggests that the court seriously considered the consequences
of initiating arbitration, even though in the end the judge opted to
dismiss the case for other reasons.
124
Despite the judgment of February 24, 2005, the Yukos affair is
experiencing further developments. In fact, Yukos's major
shareholder, Group Menatep, requested arbitration according to
article 26 of the ECT and the rules of UNCITRAL in the amount of
$28 billion!125 This proceedings will follow the others currently
pending before the Russian courts, against both the Ministry of
whether the act of State doctrine would apply to the court's consideration of the
motion to compel arbitration." In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 410 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2005).
124 Id. at 404, 408-09.
125 Democracy in Retreat in Russia: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 109th Cong. 26 (2005) (statement of Timothy Osborne, Member, Board of
Directors, Group Menatep). In his prepared statement before the U.S. Senate,
Osborne gives the details of their proposed arbitration:
[Oln February 9 of this year, Group Menatep proceeded to file a claim
against the Russian Federation under the terms of the 1994 Energy
Charter Treaty. Group Menatep's claims are based on the Russian
Federation's failure to protect the company's investments in Russia, and
specifically the expropriation of Yuganskneftegaz. The claims seek
compensation of approximately US $28.3 billion. Under the terms of the
Treaty, breaches by the Russian Federation of its international
obligations entitle the Claimants to the payment of prompt, adequate
and effective compensation. Under Article 26 of the Energy Charter
Treaty, disputes can be referred to international arbitration if they are not
settled amicably between the disputing parties within 3 months of a
notification of claim. The Claimants delivered original notifications to
the Russian Federation on November 2, 2004. Since then, the Russian
Federation has totally ignored the notifications and has failed to settle
amicably the dispute.
Id. at 26-27; see also Guy Faulconbridge, Yukos Takes Its Case to Washington,
Moscow TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at 3109 (describing the U.S. Senate hearing relating
to the Yukos bankruptcy filing in Houston); Catherine Belton, Menatep Sues Russia
for $28Bln, Moscow TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at 3102 (describing the basis of the suit
and the monetary amount of the suit). More recently, at the beginning of April
2005, parties chose their own attorneys and the Russian Federation has named its
member of the arbitration panel according to the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law Rules and article 26 of the ECT. Political Persecution of





Finance and all companies involved in the YNG auction.126 In
conclusion, the Yukos affair is far from finished and seems to have
more surprises ahead.
126 See, e.g., Andrew Neff, Too Little, Too Late? Yukos' 2000 Back Tax Penalties
May Be Dropped, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Mar. 2, 2005 (discussing the outlook
for Yukos after its "victory" in front of Russia's Supreme Arbitration Court).
20061
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
